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ABSTRACT: This paper gives an analytical method to determine the economic 
and indirect implications of denial of service and distributed denial of service 
attacks. It is based on time preference dynamics applied to the monetary mass 
for  the  restoration  of  capabilities,  on  long  term  investments  to  rebuild 
capabilities,  and  of  the  usability  level  of  the  capabilities  after  an  attack.  A 
simple illustrative example is provided for a denial of service on a corporate 
data  centre.  The  needed  data  collection  methodologies  are  categorized  by 
classes of targets. The use of the method is explained in the context of legal or 
policy  driven  dissuasive,  retaliation  or  compensation/  restoration  actions.  A 
concrete set of deployment cases in the communications service and transport 
industries  is  discussed.  The  conclusion  includes  policy  recommendations  as 





This work in progress aims at addressing two strategic aspects of cyber-warfare mostly via 
communications networks and IT applications:  a) first to take a total economic and social 
view in the assessment of evaluating damages of a cyber-warfare attacks on a society or 
business target; b) scaling a trade, economic, or legal retaliation or dissuasion for decision 
makers. It is assumed that the target of the attack does not in general have itself any or 
sufficient defence or attack means, so that a corporate or national level may decide ex-ante 
(dissuasion) or ex-post (retaliation, compensation) to scale a business defence affecting the 
economic sphere of the attacker. Such an approach is also relevant sometimes when attacker 
cannot be identified and localized precisely, so that the economic sphere of the attacker is 
restricted to business networks to which the attacker belongs. 
 
Traditionally the damage assessment has been considered “binary” and limited in time, in that 
the target was considered to be rendered totally dysfunctional until full restoration only of its 
information and communication capabilities. Lessons learnt tell us that other organizational, 
physical,  human  and  social  capabilities  are  to  be  counted  as  representing  often  larger 
collateral damage of the attacks;  their restoration eventually takes quite some time, especially 
if the surrounding society does not have enough civil defence  means and skills in place. Vice-
versa, sometimes, the replacements made to infrastructure damaged by the attack will be less 
obsolete leading to better future robustness. To address this issue, the approach is to capitalize 
on the ability of cost-benefit analysis to bundle into the internal rate of return both tangible 
and  some  intangible effects .The  internal  rate of  return expresses  the time  preference  on 
tangible and intangible assets ,old and new, which gives a break even net present value over 
the long term. It is then proposed to treat short term dynamics of this internal rate of return , 
when exposed to a Brownian shock linked to an attack affecting the command and control node for the society or business target which have their normal long term equilibrium return 
rates. 
 
Assuming the dynamic time preference resulting from a cyber-attack, it becomes possible to 
estimate    all  of  the  following  :a)  the  incremental  monetary  mass  needed  short  term  for 
restoration of equilibrium business and social capabilities; b) long term investment over a 
given pay-back horizon needed over time to restore and improve capabilities to get back to the 
equilibrium rate; c) the value of the assets degraded by the cyber-attack as short term and long 
term restoration measures impact the target. 
 
Apart from relevance in a national or corporate budgeting process, such a three-dimensional 
scaling  of  compensation,  retaliation  or  dissuasion  gives  decision  makers  a  way  to 
communicate efficiently around them and to implement such counter measures against the 
attacker’s  economic  sphere  while  referring  eventually  to  a  game  theoretical  equilibrium 
required by legal/treaty provisions. 
 
As a conclusion,  the  proposed methodology  empowers decision makers to scale eventual 
economic counter-measures or threats against attackers, the efficiency of which cannot be 
guaranteed  as  economic-social  effects  may  not  always  impact  attackers  but  surely  their 
surroundings, and as the resolution of decision makers may also vary. It will be up to the 
reader  to  assess  relevance  in  her/his  own  context,  while  this  project  has  assessed  some 
concrete cases. This project has also been motivated by specific concerns and abilities of 





The cyber attacks considered in this paper (denial of service DOS , and distributed denial of 
service DDOS) are those damaging information, capabilities, and sometimes network and 
infrastructure elements owned or operated by a target, with resulting damages not only to the 
target  but  also  to  third  parties  dependent  on  this  information,  or  those  networks  and 
infrastructure [1, 14, 16]. Damage assessment is considered difficult, as the intrusions and 
attacks cannot always be detected short term [2, 15, 17]. Nevertheless, large economic and 
social impact is felt, reaching from a unit in an organization to whole sectors; have been 
carried out as part of earlier work: descriptive assessments of the impact from surveys with 
input-output analysis of effect from outages and propagation models (e.g. [3, 7]), evaluations 
of incentives and investments to protect the information infrastructure (e.g. [4, 6, 8]), and 
evaluations of cyber-insurance premiums in relation to security procedures [5, 20]. Very few 
papers  deal  with  models  for  damage  assessment  ,  which  would  allow  a  company  to 
qualitatively and quantitatively estimate possible financial losses due to partial or complete 
interruption of connectivity ; in [9] a systems engineering approach is taken, while in the 
present one an economic and business approach is taken and  a simple numerical example is 
given in Section 4.  
 
Also we will address in Section 5 the use of damage assessment estimates on legal grounds 
for  retaliation  or  compensation  [18,  19].  A  distributed  Denial  of  Service  attack  aims  to 
deprive legitimate users of a resource or service provided by a system, by overloading the 
system with a flood of data packets, thus preventing it from processing legitimate requests. 
Therefore it is necessary as in [10] to take into account the doctrines governing the allocation of liability among key players in a distributed denial of service attack. Such doctrines are well 
established and based on common law tort principles and policy considerations.  
 
Regarding  related  types  of  attack,  such  as  malware,  viruses,  identity  theft,  exploiting 
vulnerabilities in control software / management functions/ protocols (such as DNS and BGP 
errors, lack of authentification of users, services or flows, payment solutions vulnerabilities), 
some  studies  like  those  of  Ferris  Research  and  Gartner  Research  have  shown  the  huge 
business impact thereof as well as the very high handling plus restoration costs. But such 
estimates are at best interview based, and lack an analytical framework.  
 
 
2. THEORETICAL BASIS 
 
Comparison with economic theory  
 
One way of looking at the economic consequences of a denial-of-service is to consider that 
the target has a diversity of assets included in a portfolio , each with varying life-cycles, and 
that  any  attack  affects  the  overall  value  and  sustainability  of  the  portfolio.  Whereas  in 
economics and finance the typical research question is one of asset allocation in view of 
returning some performance goals [13], the cyber-warfare economics question is one of asset 
preservation over time. Another difference with economics and finance is that in these fields’ 
risks  and  returns  are  usually  mutualised  across  populations  of  owners  or  users  via  legal 
contracts, in cyber-warfare economics the target normally stands alone at the time of attack 
with all risks and must have made all required preventive investments. The only subfield of 
economics where some common features can be identified, is the area of pension economics 
where the retired person wants to maintain over time a purchasing power level, although here 
again assets are a mix of own assets and mutualised assets. 
 
Regarding the definition of capabilities exposed to an attack, they are defined at any time as 
the  net  difference  between  a  normal  time-dependent  operational  capability  profile  of  the 
attacked entity, and the complete or partial combined effect of the attack and of restoration 
measures on normal capabilities due to the nature of the attack and restoration processes. 
Consequently, dynamics play an important role, and the proposed methodology encompasses 
situations with a net reduction in capabilities. If the attack on one target involves reduced 
capabilities of other asset owners (like in the case of a “netbot”, or the halving of transmission 
rate capability by the TCP protocol in case of a transmission error / congestion) one can either 
take a systemic view or the view of the target alone.  
 
Regarding the description of the stochastics of attack processes, only attack specific process 
specifications  with  related  methods  would  allow  to  model  them  closely,  but  macro-level 
approximations by known or tailored distributions already provide a good basis. 
 
Regarding  the  restoration  process,  it  is  also  to  have  its  specific  dynamics.  However, 
restoration is supposed to be possible, at a cost, but not impossible, thus implying that data 
protection, integrity and security must be in place. In the case of data loss prevention (DLP) , 
the Ponemon Institute has estimated from commercial cases the cost of data loss to 100 k 
Euro- 5000 k Euro of which 36 % due to commercial losses and lost customers, and 36 % 
from  loss  of  portable  data  storage.  Although  VOIP  content  is  vulnerable,  repeated  calls 
remain possible in general. 
 Proposed methodology: time preference dynamics  
 
The proposed methodology is to assume that the target applies different time preferences to 
the assets in its portfolio, where the time preference profiles express the urgency at which 
restoration of capabilities must be carried out in view of a time distributed attack (including a 
shock) degrading suddenly specific assets in the portfolio. In economics, time preference (or 
"discounting") pertains to how large a premium a user will place on usage nearer in time over 
more remote usage. 
 
Taking one class of assets, assume that the  time preference rate r(t) fluctuates around an 
equilibrium  level  r(eq)  while  subject  to  a  Brownian  point  process  W(t)  .The  short  term 
dynamics are modelled by [12]: 
 
dr(t) = a (r(eq)-r(t))dt – V.dW(t)                                                                                 (1) 
 
where : 
-  r(t) is the short term time spot preference at time t for a given asset,  0<r(t)<1 
-  a is the intensity of the feedback force towards the equilibrium time preference r(eq) 
-  r(eq) is the equilibrium time preference for that given asset 
-  V is the volatility of the time preference fluctuations 
-  W(t) is the stochastic Brownian point process driving the attack diffusion process 
 
Monetary mass requirements for restoration of capabilities  
 
The  incremental  monetary  mass  dM  (t)  needed  short  term  for  restoration  of  equilibrium 
capabilities of the asset can then be determined. Assuming for simplification purposes the 
short term time preference rate r (t) to drive short term interest rate dynamics by near a 
constant rM: 
 
dM(t) = M(t-dt). (r(t)+rM).dt     M(0)=M0 
 
where : 
-  M(t) is the monetary mass used short term to invest in rebuilding the asset capability 
to its levels just before t=0 where monetary mass represented by the asset value was 
M0 
-  rM is the fixed increment to the short term time preference producing the short term 
interest rate payable to finance the rebuild of the capabilities 
 
Long term investments to rebuild capabilities  
 
The long term investment K (t) over a given horizon TK needed long term to restore and 
improve the assets capabilities to get back to the equilibrium time preference rate r (eq) can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
dK(t) = K(t) [r(t).dt + V.BetaK.( dW(t)+Lambda.dt) ]  
BetaK = (1-exp(-a.TK))/a 
 
where :  
-  K(t) is the long term bond-like investment needed over the horizon TK to restore 
asset’s capabilities -  K(0) is the initial annuity value of the assets capability value over the horizon TK 
-  TK is the time horizon to rebuild and possibly improve on the asset’s capabilities; this 
parameter is essential in all practical cases 
-  Lambda is the premium by unit risk needed by the market to support the randomness 
over the real time preference  
-  BetaK s a constant 
 
Usability of the capabilities over time after an attack 
  
The value of the assets degraded by the cyber-attack as short term and long term restoration 
measures impact the target, is linked to a specific usability risk characterization WA (t) of the 
asset’s capabilities. The change in the degree of usability A (t) of this asset, bounded between 
0 and 1 is: 
 
dA(t) = A(t). [r(t).dt +V (dW(t)+Lambda.dt) +VA (dWA(t)+LambdA.dt)] 
 
where: 
-  the first term in the parenthesis is the effect of short term restoration via the monetary 
mass investment  
-  the second term in the parenthesis is the contribution from long term fixed horizon 
asset capability rebuild  
-  the third term is the reduction in recovery speed linked to the  volatility and risk  in the 
asset’s specific capabilities as they impact its degree of use 
-  A(t) is the effective degree of usability of the asset , A(eq)=1  
-  VA is the volatility of the asset’s capabilities usability risk  
-  WA(t) is  the Brownian motion of  the  usability risk  characterization  of the asset’s 
capabilities 
-  LambdA is the premium by time unit in unit usability risk needed by asset users to 
support the randomness over the asset’s usability risk.  
 
The unique property of this model is that all time preference variations are subject to the short 
term  time  preference and  that  the  risk exposure,  which  is  here  the  investment  needed to 
restore the asset’s capabilities, is by one bond-like financing the duration of which determines 
the  size.  The  usability  of  the  asset  is  a  Brownian  movement  correlated  with  the  time 
preference rates over time. Another characteristic of this model is that it is decoupled from the 
initial asset valuation , which can be tailored to specific cases and rely on data pre-existing to  
an attack (see Sections 4 and 5). 
 
 




This very simple example does not allow to show and exploit all the dynamic effects taking 
place, but to show how a concrete situation can lead to estimations of short term and long 
term financing needs tied to the time preference expressed. It also shows that, even if financial 
means  are  made  available  to  rebuild  capabilities,  the  actual  restoration  time  of  usable 
capabilities is very much subject to the stochastic distribution properties and to the quality of 
actual means for capabilities restoration. It also leads in Section 4 to further data collection 
methodology considerations.  
Description 
 
The numerical example pertains to a data centre in a company, with a scrap value of 10 
MEuros, running services to support company operations. The equilibrium state is one where 
all services operate 100 % to support all divisions and operations with a company turnover of 
500 MEuros/year; furthermore client capabilities are dependent on the company’s operations 
being supplied to them for another 500 MEuros /year (treated as contingent liabilities). The 
equilibrium  time  preference  r  (eq)  is  equivalent  to  the  company’s  net  operational  profit 
margin from operations r (eq) = 50 %/year, approximated as 0.5/ (365x24) = 5.7E-05 /hour. 
The short term monetary interest rates are only about 10 %/year, so that rM= -4.76E-05/hour. 
A full instantaneous attack W (0) =1 on the data centre at time t=0 reduces services usability 
to A (0) =0 with a minimum nominal restoration time of TK= 3 months for all resulting 
services and operations to internal divisions and third parties after such a disruption. The 
attack lasts dt= 1 hour , taken also as time increment, creating a shift in the time preference  to 
a very high  spot time preference value ; the maximum which can be chosen is r(1 hour)=1, 
meaning the target wants perceptually all measures to be taken for immediate recovery of the 
data centre . With a maximum volatility in time preference fluctuations of V=1 /hour, the 
needed reactivity becomes: a ~ 5.8E-05.  Post attack, the short term time preference grows 
tremendously leading to a strong rise in perceived short term monetary flows for restoration 
dM(1) of  slightly under 10 MEuros/hour ; this expresses the perception that the data centre 
must be restored at once . The total capability value of the assets over TK=3 months is 250 
MEuros with an hourly annuity of 115 740 Euros. With a risk premium Lambda= 0.2, the 
initial long  term investments dK (1)  needed to  recoup  lost supplies  to customers, and to 
rebuild the capability, can be estimated at about 235 M Euros.  For the usability risk WA (t) a 
simplified linear decreasing profile can be taken over the restoration period TK, that is WA (t) 
=1-(t/TK); we also assume LambdA=0. However,  the quality and efficiency of the restoration 
are highly volatile especially in downstream supply chains from the company ;  this leads to 
the  usability of the target’s capabilities only increasing again (dA(t)/dt >0) , despite a high 
time preference,  if the volatility VA is less than 1,2*TK .  Half of the overall capability is 
only restored at time 0,5/ (1,2-VA/TK) which can be longer than TK= 3 months for some 
values of VA. 
 
 
4. APPLICATION AREAS AND DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGIES  
 
This  paper  cannot  give  cases  or  fictive  examples  for  all  the  application  areas  for  which 
economic and social impact of denial of service need to be quantified. This Section only 
serves to survey such areas by categories and to give when known established approaches to 
assess relevant data to be fed into the calculations. 
 
1.  Public services 
 
The  denial  of  service  of  public  services  on  a  national  basis  or  on  an  agency  basis 
(administrative  services,  social  services,  water,  air  traffic,  waste  management,  financial 
payments), have wide ranging consequences where the indirect impact encompasses prejudice 
caused to citizens (in their ability to act, to get benefits or to contribute tax etc) measured in 
time  lost,  benefits  /  contributions  lost,  and  of  qualitative  damage  (health,  safety, 
administrative registrations etc). In this field, traditional cost-benefit analysis of tangible and 
intangible services applies. As to the setting of the time preference rates, they should be high for  those  public  services  where  public  authorities  by  law  have  obligations  of  service 
continuity, while they would be less and derived from minimal service obligations in other 
cases. 
 
2.  Company products and services 
 
In this case, the applicable methodology to the data collection is the one used for corporate 
liability insurance assessment. This includes loss of capabilities (physical, raw material and 
service related) with their replacement, loss of revenue due to non delivery in time, physical 
loss  of  output  such  as  manufacturing  with    associated  logistic  and  CRM  overheads  , 
indemnification  of  human  resources  if  work  or  life  is  jeopardized,  and  indirect  loss  and 
damage  to  clients.  As  to  the  setting  of  time  preference  rates,  in-company  rates  should 
correspond to the average return on assets or operational margin (whichever is largest) within 
the sector in which the company was denied services, while the same would apply for the 
clients in their respective sectors. 
 
3.  Loss of shared infrastructure 
 
There is no established methodology to cover loss of shared infrastructure, “critical” or not 
(such  as  communication  or  transportation  networks,  denial  of  service  of  a  satellite  by 
jamming, etc). However the normal approach would be to make the inventory of the lost 
capabilities  (physical  and  service  related)  by  infrastructure  operator,  of  lost  revenues  by 
infrastructure  operator  including  claims  payable  to  customers  under  contract  terms,  of 
verifiable loss and damage by individual and institutional users, and moreover of social costs 
to the same. As to the setting of time preference rates, this is a difficult issue as infrastructure 
suppliers quite often do not have contractual quality of service obligations. On the contrary, 
suppliers of “critical” infrastructure whose control systems may have been compromised, bear 
a responsibility beyond just service provisioning, and there recovery processes may be longer. 
Judgment  would  have  to  be  applied  to  the  time  preference  of  the  infrastructure  operator 
(normally very high but not coupled to financial rates of returns) and to the users taking 
diversity into account. For users the principle of setting the time preference could be based on 
the tolerable postponement of the access and use of the shared infrastructure to next normal 
period (such as shift by e.g. one day, or to next available equivalent infrastructure provider). 
 
4.  Technology providers 
 
Some well known technology providers in such areas as communications, software, control 
systems, transport technologies, biomedical devices, etc.., may be liable to claims by their 
customers  for  vulnerabilities  in  their  products, although  third  parties  are  those  exploiting 
them. While the “customer cum users” would know the attack profiles, while not always 
knowing the technical roots for the vulnerabilities, technology providers may benefit from the 
proposed framework for risk assessment if they share attack profiles with their customers. The 
risk assessment method in turn allows them to quantify reasonable levels of investments in 
improving the technologies and their distribution mechanisms.  
 
 
5. DENIAL OF SERVICE IMPACT ANALYSIS USAGE PROCESS 
 
The concept is to use the damage assessment methodology of Section 2 , with its different 
time scales, to specific data collected by  established methodologies moderated by neutral judgement (like best practices or eventually arbitration courts) (see Section 4) , to calculate 
estimates of the set of damages . Such assessments must be transparent and done by neutral 
parties. 
The assessed damages can then be used by executive authorities for a spectrum of actions: 
 
￿  Dissuasive  process:  preemptively  to  a  denial  of  service,  by  policy  makers  or 
companies, to announce that these claims would be raised if an attack occurs. The 
policy makers or companies may not have evidence yet or from past cases to identify 
the  attackers,  but  may  communicate  to  make  such  a  categorization  of  attackers 
credible  and  visible  to attackers .Also,  subject to  proper  later  judicial tracing  and 
identification of the attackers, the policy makers or companies would communicate 
that they intend to recover the amounts of the claims by all legal means in case of an 
attack. As the average cost to attackers of a cyber-attack is usually small, dissuasion 
followed  by  retaliation  or  recovery  may  be  of  some  concern  to  attackers  or  their 
backers. 
￿  Retaliation  process:  if  the  attackers  are  traced  and  identified  by  technical  and/or 
judicial  means,  or  if  strong  assumptions  and  partial  evidence  exist  (e.g.  from  IP 
addresses,  software  code  structure,  software  forensics,  etc…),  legal  or  forceful 
retaliation would be done for the same size of claims against direct or indirect interests 
of the attackers. One obvious instance of this would be to seize quarantine or destroy 
the  physical  and  communications  assets  used  by  the  attackers,  or  assets  owned 
controlled by them. This may happen in a judicial framework (with fines and penal 
measures) or an international treaty framework, but may be replaced by policy maker 
coercitive decisions including offensive means. 
￿  Compensation / Recovery process: if the attackers are traced and identified by judicial 
means, and can be put on trial, this process would use the damage assessments as 
normally done in a judicial court procedure. In this case however the data collection 
methodology and data would be subject to a contradictory evaluation, there may be 
issues of sovereignty leading to inability of enforcement/ extradition, and the delays 
involved are normally quite long. 
￿  “Keep silent” process: There is of course a fourth process, which is to ignore attacks, 
keep  silent,  report  nothing,  and  not  to  sue,  often  for  “image»  reasons.  It  is 
unfortunately very common that banks, communications and infrastructure operators 
so far do not report attacks and even figure out other reasons vis-à-vis their users. 
 
 
It is conjectured that the main practical relevance of the proposed method is for dissuasive and 
retaliation processes, resting ultimately on the ability of the asset owner / target to carry out 
and update his own exposure valuations based on estimates related to user and client damages 
(tangible and intangible). 
This  same  conjecture  is  obviously  reinforced  by  the  consideration  that  the  tracing  and 
identification of the true attackers may not always be possible, or may take so much time, that 
the strategy to use a recovery process may not work while a dissuasive or retaliation process 
may have effects when used together.  
Likewise, if attackers are using innocent identifiable resources, a recovery process would take 
time establishing that they are not responsible, while giving time to the responsible attackers. 
It should not be forgotten that cyber-attacks against corporate assets often are initiated from 
inside the company or past employees, which too opens up for a combination of dissuasive, 
retaliation and partial recovery processes. Finally, as some types of defensive measures (such as anti-virus) have fast deployable get-
around’s known to attackers, dissuasion and retaliation processes may in some cases be the 
only way forward. 
 
 
6. APPLICATION CASES 
 
This research has found its way into a number of deployment cases summarized below 
spanning all categories identified in Section 4: 
 
•  Public services 
 
   Case: minimal public transport service under employee strikes (Western Europe) 
   Contribution: the proposed method allowed to determine the public damage- number of 
employees on strike curve, allowing for the union and the employer to settle on a minimum 
service level. 
 
•  Company products and services 
 
   Case: corporate liability insurance estimate for a Scandinavian CRM provider 
   Contribution: the customer relationship management (CRM) company’s services were 
outsourced by several operators in the communications and credit card fields. The contracts 
between these operators and the CRM service supplier stipulated damage claims should the 
CRM supplier not be operational. The method allowed the CRM provider to determine the 
liability insurance amount it had to get cover for vis-à-vis cyber attacks to compensate its 
customers. 
 
•  Loss of shared communications infrastructure 
 
    Case: attack on 3G operator BSC with partial recovery via other operator(s) 
    Contribution:  The wireless 2G and 3G base system controller manages the connectivity to 
and from radio base systems (RBS). Due to bad network management or practices, some BSC 
are not totally immune from certain types of attacks. When redundancy and restoration 
procedures have failed, radio coverage and connectivity may be lost unless back-up is 
activated from other operator’s BSC (when feasible). Such operators have to be compensated, 
as well as possibly some wireless service users under contractual terms, and total damage 
assessment with/without insurance may be necessary. 
 
Mobile networks not only provide great benefits to their users but they also introduce inherent 
security issues. With respect to security, the emerging risks of denial of service (DOS and 
DDOS)  attacks  will  evolve  into  a  critical  danger  as  the  availability  of  mobile  networks 
becomes more and more important for the modern information society. There are ways to 
mitigate  the  attacks  by  adding  minimal  authentication  to  the  radio  channel  assignment 
protocol, but this too has business implications and requires risk assessment. At the same 
time,  via  subscriber  management,  interoperable  management  and  signalling  /  control 
networks,  they  carry  the  potential  for  tracing  and  retaliation  measures,  besides  lawful 
interception in support of legal procedures. In particular is highlighted the retaliation process 
which  international  inter-carrier  settlements  allow  for,  as  such  agreements  reach  out 
worldwide.  
 Finally, it has been brought to the attention of the author, that other applications exist, e.g. in 
the case of water distribution protection, where attacks have wide reaching implications, and 
where physical-chemical forensic evidence may be collected. In this case the attack has both 




While law and jurisprudence regarding denial of service and other cyber-attacks is making 
slow progress in both national and international arenas, this paper presents a quantitative 
approach respecting attack and restoration dynamics likely to be used in dissuasion as well as 
in  retaliatory  processes,  in  the  hope  that  ultimately  attackers  will  feel  a  largely  missing 
retroaction. It may also allow institutions and companies to determine by self-analysis in the 
presence of a given threat profile, which assets to protect in priority on economic, business 
and social grounds. 
 
In the event international organizations like GATT, European Space Policy Institute, OECD 
or the European Parliament (“Declaration on the reinforcement of international security”, 25 
March 2003 and report to the Council of 11 December 2008) also embark on putting an 
economic and social measure to cyber-attacks, supplemented by constraining legal measures, 
instead stating of political / cultural or defence values only, this research may give elements 
of the analysis. 
 
Specific policy recommendations linked to the above research and the deployed cases, would 
be the following: 
-in international commercial contract law, allow for compensation and information exchange 
clauses whereby attackers using one party’s facilities or services to mount an attack on the 
other  party,  may  retaliate  against  the  attackers  on  the  basis  of  damage  assessment  and 
evidence provided by the other party; an example of this are international communications 
operators inter-operator settlement procedures; 
-enhance auditing procedures, to verify the basis for insurance or damage claims in the case of 
cyber-attacks; 
-mandate  reporting  and  information  exchange  about  attacks  to  designated  governmental 
bodies, for sharing of attack profiles and partial evidence (like envisaged by the EU). 
  
Just  as  technical  vulnerability  reduction  demands  collaborative  efforts  between  users, 
technology providers and operators, the business and social impact assessments also demand 
such collaboration  and information exchange, besides internal due  diligence.  The  issue is 
which governments, players and sectors, like the communications industry, will take concrete 
steps in this direction. One reason why this is an issue is that “patches” and additional costly 
imperfect technologies are too often preferred to demanding and longer lasting  technical, 
legal, architectural and economic measures. It is in this context that humanities, economic and 
social disciplines can clarify the way towards peace in cyber conflicts [21]. 
 
What this research does not allow to do is to account for interdependencies between targets 
and  attackers,  or  proxies  to  the  attackers,  due  to  cross-ownership,  exclusive  agreements, 
shared infrastructure (buildings, communications, transport, and energy), geo-economics and 
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